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Abstract 
 
Females typically earn less than males.  The reasons are not fully understood.  This paper re-
examines the idea that women ‘don’t ask’, which potentially assigns part of the responsibility for 
the gender pay gap on to female behavior.  Such an account cannot readily be tested with standard 
data sets.  This paper is the first to be able to use matched employer-employee data in which 
workers are questioned about their asking behaviour.  It concludes that males and females ask 
equally often for promotions and raises.  The paper’s empirical results suggest, however, that while 
women do now ask they ‘don’t get’. 
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Do Women Ask? 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores one of the famous puzzles of the modern workplace.  Across the 
industrialized world, female workers typically earn less than their male counterparts.   It is not 
completely understood why this pattern -- one consistent with the existence of gender 
discrimination -- persists.i  The paper is able to draw upon an unusual form of survey evidence.  
Using new data, it revisits two ideas that have been put forward, in different forms, in writings in 
the industrial relations, psychology, social science, and labor economics literatures.  They can be 
expressed in a simplified form as:  
Idea 1. In certain circumstances, women may have a lower propensity than men to ask for pay 
raises and promotions; 
Idea 2. Women may be reluctant to ‘ask’ because they are more concerned than men about the 
quality of their relationships in the workplace. 
It seems important to try to assess these arguments.  First, they assign part of the 
responsibility for gender differentials on to females and their own actions.  Second, our approach 
allows us to probe whether there might have been a change in women’s propensity to ask for a pay 
raise, since what is widely recognized as the seminal work of Babcock and Laschever (2003) in 
the monograph entitled Women Don’t Ask.   
These issues are important, and live, ones.  In the recent words of Blau and Kahn (2017): 
“Women’s lower propensity to negotiate over salaries, raises, or promotions, could reduce their 
pay relative to men’s. The observed gender difference could reflect social factors, including 
women being socialized to feel that they are being pushy or overbearing…” 
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In this paper we estimate econometric ‘asking’ equations.  We use labor market data for 
the period 2013-14.  In most survey data sets used by labor economists, it is intrinsically hard to 
assess Ideas 1 and 2.  The reason is that the information gathered in conventional surveys is on 
people’s actual earnings (rather than on whether workers are ‘asking’) and on other objective 
aspects of workplaces (rather than on underlying psychological reasons and attitudes).  This is 
probably why little formal testing of these ideas has been done on real-world field data.   
There is substantial published evidence about the factors that help to explain variations in 
negotiating behavior between men and women.  Three areas have attracted special attention: (a) 
the nature of the task being negotiated and the situation in which negotiation takes place, (b) 
whether negotiation over pay has been established as an explicit norm in the workplace or is 
ambiguous, and (c) personal facets, such as potentially lower confidence among women, and the 
identity costs of behaving “out of role”, because negotiating over economic factors can be viewed 
as an intrinsically male form of behavior (Heilman, 2001; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007; Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2007; Kray and Gelfand, 2009; Inzlicht 2011; Sandberg, 2013; Leibbrandt and 
List, 2015; Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke and Hertel, 2015).  Early, and 
pioneering, work in this area was done by the psychologist Alice Eagly, as in Eagly (1987) and 
Eagly and Karau (2002).   
A number of previous studies are particularly relevant.  In an experimental setting, Bear 
and Babcock (2012) find no difference in gender negotiating performance when the product being 
negotiated is viewed as more ‘female’ (e.g. glass beads).  However, when the product is perceived 
as more ‘masculine’ (e.g. car headlights), men out-negotiate women.  Although there is some 
evidence that men on average do better in economic negotiating situations, there is considerable 
empirical support for the fact that the context and the nature of the task can have a mediating 
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influence (Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke and Hertel, 2015).  Furthermore, men 
are more likely than women to overestimate their abilities (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 
1982; Kay and Shipman, 2014), and this is also more pronounced when men undertake tasks that 
are considered to be masculine (Moore and Small, 2007).  Other moderating factors favoring 
female negotiators include experience in negotiating (Zerres, Hüffmeier, Freund, Backhaus, and 
Hertel, 2013), knowing the bargaining range (Bowles and McGinn, 2008), and when advocating 
on behalf of another person in a negotiation (Amanatullah and Morris, 2010; Mazei, Hüffmeier, 
Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke and Hertel, 2015).   
In a field experiment, Leibbrandt and List (2015) provide interesting and nuanced results.  
First, the authors find no difference between men and women in the special circumstance that 
workers are explicitly told that wage negotiation is permitted.  When the “rules of wage 
determination” are left ambiguous, however, Leibbrandt and List conclude that men do tend to 
negotiate higher pay.  The authors show that men prefer an ambiguous wage environment.  When 
there is no explicit statement that wages are negotiable, females are more likely than males to 
signal their willingness to work for a lower wage rate.  
A number of other factors appear to reduce women’s propensity to negotiate.  Women who 
deviate from a perceived female stereotype, for example, can suffer what has been called “identity 
costs”, and, if behaving “out of role” (Heilman, 2001; Heilman and Okimoto, 2007; Inzlicht 2011), 
such as when negotiating, females may be less popular in professional life.  The performance of 
individuals who belong to negatively stereotyped groups has been found to be lower (Schmader 
and Johns, 2003).  Ample evidence also demonstrates the effect of self-stereotypes and stereotype 
threats on the behavior of women.  For example, girls’ math performances decrease when their 
gender is made salient (Spencer, Steele and Quinn, 1999; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2006).  The 
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same is true for performance in competitions (Guenther et al., 2010).   Female self-stereotypes 
seem to decrease women’s proclivity to compete with men (Gupta and Bhawe, 2007).  Niederle 
and Vesterlund (2007) show that the tournament-entry gap between males and females is mainly 
driven by women’s preference not to compete due to negative self-stereotyping.   
Bowles, Babcock and Lai (2007) demonstrate, in a number of laboratory experiments, that 
men penalize women who initiate salary negotiations; however, women penalize all participants 
when those participants initiate negotiations.  The authors attribute their results to perceptions of 
‘niceness’ and ‘demandingness’.  Females who adopt counter-stereotypical behavior can be 
accused of lacking in social skill. They then can suffer professionally when attention is diverted 
away from functional competence to social skills (Phelan, Moss-Racusin and Rudman, 2008). 
Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) conclude that women are penalized when they behave in a way 
that can be viewed as overly masculine or overly feminine.   The authors examine self-advocating 
female negotiators and those who negotiate on behalf of others.  Women were shown in this study 
to be less liked when they assertively negotiated for themselves.  However, if other-advocating 
women exhibit non-assertive behavior, they also suffer a backlash, and can be perceived as having 
low competence.  The effects found for women negotiators are absent for males (Amanatullah and 
Tinsley, 2013).  
It seems that women adapt their behavior -- in order to fit the context -- to advance their 
success in negotiating (Amanatullah and Morris, 2010).  Additionally, women appear to know 
when it is efficacious to enter negotiations, and males experience less financial harm from 
negotiating more (Exley, Niederle, and Vesterlund, 2017).  A danger with stereotype-consistent 
behavior is that it may perpetuate stereotypes (Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2006).  Yet recent evidence 
suggests there may have been some positive movement.  In being assessed as leaders, Bongiorno, 
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Bain and David (2014) find that assertive women are viewed as being as likeable and influential 
as assertive men.  Being tentative in leadership, however, makes females more unpopular, although 
that is not true of males.   
Our study builds upon the still-growing literature on why females have less success in the 
labor market.  Despite progress in areas such as education, women lag behind men, especially at 
senior levels (for example, in the board room, Gregory-Smith et al. 2014), and this has led to calls 
for new thinking (Goodall and Osterloh, 2017).  Recent work by Card et al. (2016) demonstrates 
that females receive only 90% of the firm-specific remuneration that is earned by males.    
The data set used in this paper has advantages that have been denied to most, and perhaps 
all, previous researchers on gender differentials.  First, the individuals in our data are questioned 
in detail about their motives, behavior, and histories.  Unlike in standard data sources, therefore, it 
is in principle possible -- admittedly in an imperfect way -- to inquire into ‘why’ women and men 
choose to act in the ways observed.  Second, our data are from matched worker-employer surveys 
in which random samples of male and female employees can be studied.  This is a valuable feature 
for the present inquiry.  It makes it possible to control for a large number of background factors 
about workplaces that are not observable to the statistical investigator and would be impossible to 
allow for properly in many conventional data sets.  The paper’s econometric estimates are thus 
‘within-employer’.  
To anticipate the later results, the paper is not able to find support for the two women-
don’t-ask premises, (i) and (ii), that are stated at the beginning of the paper.  Instead, the evidence 
seems more consistent -- especially once we control for variables unavailable to prior researchers 
-- with the view that women ask but do not get.  The data used here are fairly recent.  One likely 
possibility, in our judgment, is that negotiating behavior in the modern era has begun to change.    
7 
 
Finally, special mention should be made of an early study in Great Britain (McGovern et 
al., 2007), which is an analysis of the Working in Britain survey, and also does not find evidence 
to favor a women-don’t-ask view.  The WiB survey requests information from workers about 
whether since joining their employer they have ever asked for a pay raise.  In a logistic regression, 
the coefficient on female is negative, and fairly large, but the authors report that it is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.  The authors can control for union membership, social class, 
education, and a small number of other covariates.  They are not able to control for employer fixed-
effects, but do allow for a variable for establishment size.     
3. Data 
The data source used in the analysis is a statistically representative sample of all Australian 
employees and workplaces: the recently available Australian Workplace Relations Survey 
(AWRS).  The data set covers the years 2013-2014.  It has the distinctive feature that it asks 
individuals a set of questions about whether their pay is set by negotiation with the company, 
whether they have successfully obtained a wage raise or promotion since joining the employer, 
whether they preferred not to attempt to negotiate a pay raise because they were concerned about 
their relationships, why they decided that, and about their levels of satisfaction.   
Like other nations, Australia has a gender pay gap (see Appendix C in this paper, for 
example).  Careful modern work on the foundations of the Australian gap between males and 
females includes Johnston and Lee (2012). 
 Using these new AWRS data, Tables 1a and 1b give descriptive information about the 
sample.  The data set offers information on approximately 4600 randomly sampled workers across 
840 workplaces.  For the later analysis, we will be especially interested in answers to questions 
asking for information such as whether: 
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 “I have not attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself since I commenced 
employment with this employer” 
 
“Why have you not attempted to attain a better wage/promotion for yourself since you 
commenced your employment? … I’m concerned about negative effects on my relationship with 
my manager/employer” 
 
“I have successfully attained a better wage/salary for myself through negotiating with my 
manager/employer (i.e. without changing roles)” 
 
We will, for example, set a dummy to equal zero if respondents agreed with "I have not 
attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself since I commenced employment with this 
employer", and equal to one if they did not agree with the statement.  This can then be treated as a 
dependent variable in a regression equation, with standard demographic and workplace variables 
included as independent variables.  
 It might be wondered if the method of pay-setting in Australia could be influential.  Later 
econometric work, however, will provide ‘within-employer’ estimates when comparing males and 
females, so that background influences are held appropriately constant between the two genders.      
In the data set, a little over half of workers are female, and the mean age of the sample is 
slightly under 41 years old.  For 20% of the workforce, the highest educational qualification is a 
bachelor’s degree.  A further 16% of workers have further degrees.  These proportions on 
educational attainment do not vary greatly across males and females.  Just over half the sample are 
married, and for 86% of employees their language used at home is English.  Fulltime workers 
make up 64% of the sample.  At the mean, the number of hours worked is 37 per week.   
The paper’s focus is upon what happens during pay-setting.  Approximately 39% of 
employees say, as shown in Table 1a, that they are in a job where they negotiate their salary with 
the company.  This proportion is broadly comparable to the U.S. figure of 33% reported in Hall 
and Krueger (2012) ii.   In the raw data of Table 1b, women are less likely than men to say they are 
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in a job where they negotiate wages.  The figure for males is approximately 48%; the figure for 
females is approximately 33%.  Although the authors do not focus upon the issue of gender, Hall 
and Krueger report a figure of 25% for U.S. females.  
In AWRS, information is also available on whether employees say they have attempted to 
attain a better salary since they commenced employment with the organization.  Here, in Table 1b, 
it can be seen that 75% of males report that they have asked for a raise in pay, while 66% of the 
women have asked.  Hence, in terms of Idea 1 above, it is true as a descriptive and aggregate 
statement that women ask less (both when joining and when already employed by the employer), 
and, as a referee has pointed out, Table 1b is consistent with Leibbrandt and List, 2015).  Later 
tables explore whether that remains true when other characteristics are held constant.  Table 1b 
also reveals that 14.6% of males say they have not attempted to obtain a raise because of concern 
for their relationships in the workplace.  A smaller number, 12.9%, of females say this.  Hence, in 
the raw data, there is no clear support for Idea 2, above, that women are disproportionately wary 
of requesting a raise in salary.  
4. Regression Results 
  There are two main ways to ‘ask’ in a workplace.  One method is to seek to be promoted 
at work.  The other is to seek greater pay in the existing job and grade. 
Table 2 begins with the issue of whether, after adjusting for other factors, there is evidence 
in this data set that females request promotion either more or less often than do males (in earlier 
work by Pergamit and Veum, 1999, it was found in NLSY data that women were promoted less 
often than males).  The null hypothesis is taken to be that the two genders behave similarly.  Table 
2 thus estimates a regression equation in which there are 4582 observations on individuals who 
work across 840 different employers. iii  The dependent variable in the regression equations of 
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Table 2 is a one or zero when respondents in the survey answer that, with this employer, ‘I have 
asked for promotion’.  In each of the three columns of Table 2, the coefficient on a female dummy 
variable is close to zero (and in two of the three columns has the wrong sign for a women-don’t-
ask view).  In the fullest specification, the coefficient is 0.013 with a t-statistic of 0.971.  Hence it 
is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that women and men ask equally often for promotion.  
This conclusion holds in each of the three columns, where the first column includes as covariates 
only gender, age and age squared, whether English is the language spoken in the person’s home, 
and a set of employer fixed-effect dummies, and the third column includes a larger set of covariates 
that include the number of working hours and occupational and educational dummies. These 
estimates are effectively within-employer.   
A second way to obtain greater pay is to get a raise in the current job.  Table 3 therefore 
turns to the question of whether, while in their existing role, women and men say they behave 
differently in their asking behavior.  In this table, three dependent variables are used.  These are 
dichotomous answers to questions on ‘My pay is negotiated’, ‘I have successfully obtained a pay 
raise while with the employer’, and ‘I have attempted to obtain a pay raise’.  In each of these, there 
are three columns in the tables, and the regression equations build up to longer specifications in 
right-hand columns as more variables are added.  The survey does not provide information on how 
many times people have asked; hence we treat the data as 0-1.   
In each equation of Table 3, a set of employer dummies has been included.  This again has 
the statistical advantage that a variety of background influences -- that are specific to each 
company but not observable to the statistical investigator -- are held constant.   
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3 reveal some differences between men and women.  With a 
large number of other covariates included, females are less likely to say that pay is negotiated (with 
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a coefficient of -0.060 in column 3) in the workplace; here that is a structural characteristic of the 
workplace, of course, and not a measure of individual asking behavior.  A referee has raised the 
insightful puzzle of how it could be that, within a workplace in which men also work, females 
could say relatively less often -- than males -- that pay is not negotiated there.  We do not precisely 
know how to answer that.  However, any bias or error, if that is what it is, would act to reinforce 
the paper’s chief finding.  Women ask for pay raises at the same rate as men even if, on average, 
they do not view negotiation as being so likely in their workplace.      
In Table 3, females are less likely to report that they have been successful in obtaining a 
salary raise while working for the current employer (with a coefficient of -0.04 in column 6).  
Given the mean success rate of 0.16 in the data, this implies that women are one quarter less likely 
to obtain a raise.  On the precise definition of ‘success’, here the zero-one dependent variable 
measures success in negotiating (that does not preclude eventual success in some other way such 
as promotion; promotion equations were given earlier).   A number of the other independent 
variables enter significantly in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3.  Age, for example, follows a concave 
shape.  There is evidence that individuals with higher levels of education are both more likely to 
be in a job with negotiation and to have been successful in negotiating a pay raise after they joined 
the employer.  Job tenure enters, respectively, negatively in the Negotiated column and positively 
in the Successful column.  Those employees with longer hours of work are more likely to say their 
pay is set by negotiation, and also more likely to say they have been successful in obtaining a 
salary increase.  
5. Not Asking or Not Getting? 
Is it true that women do not ask for pay raises?  Column 9 of Table 3 sheds doubt on that iv.  
The analysis uncovers no statistically significant difference between men and women in the 
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probability of having asked.  Nevertheless, unlike the earlier result on the equal rate of asking for 
promotion, this inference rests, importantly, upon the statistical investigator having information 
about the number of hours worked by each employee.  Once the equation includes a variable for 
the number of hours worked, then the column 8 coefficient in Table 3 of -0.048 on Female, with a 
t-statistic of 2.566, becomes in column 9 a coefficient of -0.026, with a t-statistic of 1.420.   
There is a potential concern here with Type II errors.  Nevertheless, -0.026 is a small 
coefficient, and not merely a large one for which the null of zero cannot be rejected, so the 
dominant effect, in the last three columns of Table 3, is apparently coming not from being a woman 
per se.  Instead, on closer scrutiny, the appearance of a lack of ‘asking’ is being driven statistically 
by working a shorter number of hours.  Males who work shorter hours also ‘do not ask’. 
To check more fully on whether the insignificance of gender for ‘asking’ is being caused 
erroneously, Table 4 explores a further permutation.  Here the sample is divided into Part-timers 
and Full-timers, where the cut-off is defined as fewer than 38 hoursv.   
However, Table 3’s substantive conclusions continue to hold.  Once again, it is not possible 
to reject the null hypothesis of no difference, in the ‘I Have Asked’ columns, between male workers 
and female workers.  Column 6 of Table 4 seems of interest, because this provides a test for full-
time males compared to full-time females.  In column 6 of Table 4, the coefficient on the female 
dummy is -0.015, with a small t-statistic of 0.619.  Thus again there seems no compelling evidence 
here that males and females behave differently.  It is impossible, we stress, to be sure that Type II 
errors have been avoided.   However, even were the point estimate to be taken at face value, the 
difference in the asking rate between men and women would be just one and a half percentage 
points.  We return to this general issue at the end of the paper.  
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In Table 1a, nearly one third of workers said they had not attempted to get a higher wage.  
Among workers who never requested a pay raise, what do they give as reasons for their lack of 
asking?  Tables 5 and 6 provide regression-equation evidence.  These tables test among a variety 
of verbatim potential explanations that were offered to the interviewees as part of the AWRS 
survey.  Column 3 of Table 5 documents weak evidencevi for the fact that women may be being 
influenced by the fact they are more satisfied -- than equivalently qualified men -- with their wage 
(consistent with results in Clark and Oswald, 1996).  However, column 6 of Table 5 implies that 
it is not because women are relatively satisfied -- in comparison with the males answering the same 
question -- with their actual role in the organization.    
Table 6 explores additional possibilities.  It gives regression equations where, in the three 
columns, the dependent variables are respectively dichotomous variables for ‘I have not asked for 
a salary raise because there is no process here for doing so’; ‘I have not asked for a salary raise 
because I am concerned about negative effects on my relationship with my manager/employer’; ‘I 
have not asked for a salary raise because my role would not be seen as worthy of a higher wage’.  
The female dummy is insignificantly different from zero in each of the columns of Table 6.  
Moreover, as before, the key coefficient here (of -0.012) is small, and not merely insignificantly 
different from zero.  Women are apparently not being influenced by a disproportionate concern 
for their relationships. 
6. Checks 
A number of statistical checks into the results were done. 
First, although the inclusion of a full set of employer dummies has advantages, it might be 
thought that too much statistical power is lost (because some workplaces have only one or two 
sampled employees).  However, we verified that the omission of the 840 dummies does not alter 
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the paper’s substantive results.  At the referees’ suggestion, we also tested, and found no role for, 
employer-size interactions (see the supplementary online material).  
Second, a possible cause for concern is the lack of a measure of frequency-of-times that 
workers have asked for a raise at their employer, or a variable for when workers began asking for 
raises.  It might be that men ask for raises earlier and more frequently than women and that this is 
why men are more successful than women at eventually securing a raise.  While the AWRS data 
do not provide full information on this issue, a suitable variable may lie in workers’ tenure.  If men 
request raises earlier and more often than women, we should find a statistically significant 
difference between newer (lower tenure) male and female employees in their requests for raises.  
A check for this was done.  Appendix B presents results among workers with less than 1 year, 3 
years, and 5 years of tenure – and finds no significant differences between men and women. 
Third, it is relevant to inquire into potential differences across age categories.  One 
possibility is that there might be some form of cohort effect.  It could be that younger generations 
of employees have different attitudes to the topic of gender than did their parents.   
In our data set, it is not possible to distinguish a true cohort-effect from a true age-effect.  
However, as in Appendix A, it is feasible to split the sample into age sub-categories.  Interestingly, 
for workers under the age of 41, in the table of Appendix A, there appears to be no difference, in 
a regression-adjusted sense, between males and females in: whether they are in a job where pay is 
negotiated; whether they have been successful in obtaining a raise in pay if they asked for one; 
whether they did request such a raise.   
Overall, in this sample there are differences across age-groups.  The younger women in the 
labor market appear statistically indistinguishable from the younger men.  Hence it could be that 
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negotiating behavior through the years has begun to change.  Future research may be able to decide 
whether true cohort-effects can be detected. 
    Fourth, it might be thought that the women-don’t-ask argument could apply to some groups 
rather than others.  Perhaps elite men (like those in MBA classes of the sort examined in the 
seminal work by Babcock and Laschever, 2003 and 2009, and Babcock et al. 2006) ask more than 
elite women, for example.  Hence we scrutinized Table 3 kinds of specifications for various sub-
samples.  When we split the sample by education at the median, we found no difference in the 
female coefficient by education of the worker.  Even when, on a referee’s suggestion, we split on 
postgraduate degrees, we did not detect significant effects. 
 Fifth, a further potential concern is the possible role of trade unions (as union members 
may feel that the union negotiates for them rather than they negotiate personally).  However, 
because we control for employer fixed-effects, it might be hoped that that would adjust for much 
of that possible influence.  We also adjust for ‘awards’, which in Australia are legal documents 
that outline the minimum pay and conditions of employment; there are 122 industry or occupation 
awards in Australia.  Moreover, on the suggestion of a referee, adding an additional control for the 
employee’s union status did not alter the key results. 
 Sixth, it would be interesting to validate the paper’s findings for workers who are at 
different points in employers’ hierarchies.  Here, however, we have only limited information.  
Nevertheless, when we divided the sample into workers who can be classified as managers (there 
are 819) or not managers (there are 3763), in a Has Asked for a Pay Raise equation, the coefficients 
on the female dummy were again small at, respectively, 0.005 and -0.026, with large standard 
errors in both cases.   
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A range of other subsample divisions, and tests for interactions, are reported in the 
supplementary online material in Tables S1 to S4.   
7. Conclusion 
This paper, which exploits a data set that is the first of its kind, produces results that seem 
inconsistent with earlier findings that gender pay differences exist partially because ‘women-don't-
ask’.  It is able to study two kinds of ‘asking’ equations: asking for promotion and asking for pay 
raises while in the current job.  With the data available to us, it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that males and females behave similarly.   
Such a conclusion should be kept in perspective.  Our paper does not claim, it should be 
emphasized, that males and females act identically in modern workplaces.   Recent research on 
gender in negotiation, as just one example, has found evidence that women (as compared to men) 
have a stronger social motivation to hold back from negotiating for higher pay because they are 
more likely to encounter backlash (Amanatullah and Morris, 2010; Amanatullah and Tinsley, 
2013; Bowles, Babcock, and Lai, 2007).  Other differences have been persuasively documented 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003).   
The current paper creates within-employer estimates and uses modern data to examine two 
ideas.  The first is that women may be reluctant to ask for higher pay (Idea 1 in the Introduction), 
and the second is that this may occur because they fear for the quality of their workplace 
relationships (Idea 2 in the Introduction).  There seems an important reason to do such a test.  It is 
that the women-don’t-ask theory places part of the responsibility for the existence of gender 
differentials upon females themselves. 
In performing the analysis, we attempt to hold constant as many other influences as is 
feasible.  The paper is able to control for hours of work -- something that was not possible for 
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previous researchers -- so that the comparison being made is between full-time males and full-time 
females, and between part-time males and part-time females.  This adjustment for hours is 
particularly important.  Once it is done, regression equations for the likelihood of ‘asking’ do not 
show a statistically significant difference between men and women; to put that conclusion 
differently, both part-time men and part-time women tend ‘not to ask’, which resonates with the 
results on the apparent relative diffidence of lower-status males found in Al Dabbagh, Bowles, and 
Thomason, 2016.    
In terms of ‘getting’, by contrast, column 6 of Table 3 reveals a systematic difference by 
gender.  Females are less successfulvii.  Such a conclusion -- asking yet not getting -- seems 
potentially important.  It demands further scrutiny in future research and in other nations’ data.    
The study also probes human motives.  It estimates equations to test whether, in 
considering to ask or not, females are more concerned than males about possible deleterious effects 
on their relationships.  No evidence is found for that, either, in these data.   
Caveats should be noted, and they are not trivial ones.  First, in this study we have had to 
rely on what people tell us in surveys.  If, say, men have a disproportionately greater propensity to 
conceal the truth, then our results might, in principle, be biased in some way.  It is possible that, 
perhaps as part of a desire to appear assertive, male workers are more likely than females to claim 
to have asked when they have not viii done so; it is also possible, as has been suggested to us by 
some readers, that females behave in a subconsciously more emollient way.  Second, this data set 
is for modern Australia.  If that country is unusualix, the findings from our study might not apply 
elsewhere.  Appendix C, however, checks that Australia has the typical kind of gender pay gap of 
approximately 15%.  Third, our results have concentrated on the case where hours of work are 
held constant.  This is arguably natural, because we wish here to do a ceteris paribus comparison 
18 
 
between males and females, but we have not attempted to explain the observed difference in the 
mean number of working hours between men and women. x  Fourth, the analysis has not been able 
to uncover exactly why women are paid less than men.  
Finally, we would wish to caution the reader on one issue.  We are cognizant of the 
possibility that this study’s results might be subject to Type II errors.  As is often the case in 
statistical science, it is hard decisively to rule that out.  Nevertheless, such a possibility should be 
seen in perspective.  In the case of Table 3, the key estimated Female coefficient (of -0.026) is 
small and not merely insignificantly different from zero.  In the fullest specification of column 6 
of Table 4, in fact, it is tiny at just -0.015.  Moreover, for tables such as Table 2 and Table 6, the 
Female coefficients (of 0.013 and -0.012, respectively) have the wrong signs to be consistent with 
either Idea 1 or Idea 2.   
How well the paper’s results apply to other nations remains to be discovered.  We believe 
the general area to be an important one in social science -- for researchers and the world at large. 
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Footnotes 
 
In accordance with this journal’s instructions, the footnotes have been placed at the end of the 
manuscript.  
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Table 1A: Descriptive statistics (AWRS data 2013-2014)  
Number of observations: 4582 employees across 840 employers 
  Whole sample 
Variable Description Mean SD 
    
Age Age of worker in years 40.374 12.506 
Age squared Age of worker squared 1,786.403 1,049.501 
Female = 1 if worker is female and 0 if male 0.576 0.494 
Married = 1 if married and 0 if not 0.519 0.500 
Dependents = 1 if worker has children 15 or younger; 0 if not 0.327 0.469 
Secondary = 1 if completed secondary education; 0 if not 0.241 0.428 
Certificate = 1 if completed certificate education; 0 if not 0.254 0.435 
Diploma = 1 if completed diploma education; 0 if not 0.147 0.354 
Bachelor degree = 1 if completed bachelor education; 0 if not 0.201 0.401 
Graduate = 1 if completed graduate education; 0 if not 0.064 0.244 
Post-graduate = 1 if completed postgraduate education; 0 if not 0.093 0.291 
Employer tenure Length of time spent with employer in years 5.808 6.039 
Weekly hours 
worked Usual weekly hours worked 37.154 10.882 
Part time job = 1 if weekly hours worked is less than 38; 0 if not 0.359 0.480 
Pay is negotiated  = 1 if salary is a “negotiated amount with employer” and 0 otherwise 0.389 0.488 
Successful 
= 1 if “successfully attained a better wage/salary 
through negotiating with the manager/employer 
(without changing roles) and 0 if not 
0.160 0.367 
Has asked for raise 
= 1 if “attempted to attain a better wage/salary since 
commencing employment with this employer” and 0 
otherwise 
0.696 0.460 
Has asked for 
promotion 
= 1 if “attempted to get a promotion” and 0 
otherwise 0.891 0.312 
Satisfied with wage = 1 if “satisfied with wage/salary” and 0 otherwise 0.338 0.473 
No process 
= 1 if “there is no process/procedure to be able to 
access a better wage to perform role” and 0 
otherwise 
0.213 0.410 
Concerned about 
relationships 
= 1 if “concerned about negative effects on 
relationship with manager/employer” and 0 
otherwise 
0.136 0.342 
Role not worthy = 1 if “role wouldn’t be seen by manager/employer as worthy of a higher wage” and 0 otherwise 0.150 0.357 
Satisfied in role = 1 if “satisfied in role” and 0 otherwise 0.235 0.424 
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Table 1B: Gender sub-sample statistics (AWRS 2013-2014) 
 Males Females 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 41.124 12.393 39.820 12.561 
Age squared 1,844.738 1,061.886 1,743.376 1,038.375 
English 0.852 0.355 0.866 0.341 
Married 0.579 0.494 0.475 0.499 
Dependents 0.369 0.483 0.297 0.457 
Secondary 0.245 0.430 0.238 0.426 
Certificate 0.270 0.444 0.242 0.429 
Diploma 0.136 0.343 0.155 0.362 
Bachelor degree 0.192 0.394 0.208 0.406 
Graduate 0.059 0.236 0.067 0.250 
Post-graduate 0.098 0.298 0.089 0.286 
Employer tenure 6.107 6.335 5.588 5.802 
Part time job 0.174 0.379 0.496 0.500 
Weekly hours worked 41.602 9.862 33.873 10.426 
‘Pay is negotiated’ 0.477 0.500 0.325 0.468 
‘Successful since joining’ 0.200 0.400 0.131 0.337 
‘I have asked for pay raise’ 0.745 0.436 0.660 0.474 
‘I have asked for promotion’ 0.902 0.298 0.883 0.322 
‘Satisfied with wage’ 0.361 0.481 0.324 0.468 
‘No process’ 0.182 0.387 0.231 0.422 
‘Concerned about relationships’ 0.146 0.354 0.129 0.336 
‘Role not worthy’ 0.160 0.367 0.144 0.352 
‘Satisfied in role’ 0.251 0.434 0.225 0.418 
 
The variable ‘pay is negotiated’ is a dummy for whether the employee says that pay levels are fixed by negotiation 
with the employer (this is not, it should perhaps be emphasized, a measure of ‘asking’). ‘Successful since joining’ is 
a dummy for having attained a higher salary during this job tenure with the current employer. ‘I have asked for pay 
raise’ is a dummy for having requested a greater salary during this job tenure with the current employer.  ‘I have 
asked for promotion’ is a dummy for having requested a promotion with the current employer.  ‘Satisfied with wage’ 
is a dummy for reporting that I am satisfied with my income in the job with the current employer. ‘No process’ is a 
dummy for reporting that there is no process in this job for obtaining a higher salary.  ‘Concerned about 
relationships’ is a dummy for answering yes to “Why have you not attempted to attain a higher salary… I’m 
concerned about negative effects on my relationship with my manager/employer.”  ‘Role not worthy’ is a dummy for 
answering yes to “Why have you not attempted to attain a higher salary… My role wouldn’t be seen by my 
manager/employer as worthy of a higher wage.”  ‘Satisfied in role’ is a dummy for answering yes to “Why have you 
not attempted to attain a higher salary… I am satisfied in my role.”   
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Table 2:  Regression Equations for I Have Asked for a Promotion (AWRS 2013-2014). 
Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
  
I have asked for a promotion  
(1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.008 0.003 0.013 
 (-0.717) (0.199) (0.971) 
Age 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (4.698) (3.341) (3.019) 
Age squared -1.6x10-4*** -1.3x10-4*** -1.2x10-4*** 
 (-4.259) (-3.263) (-2.896) 
English -0.003 -0.014 -0.017 
 (-0.206) (-0.877) (-1.067) 
Married 
 
1.8x10-4 0.001 
  (0.014) (0.108) 
Dependents 
 
-0.004 0.002 
  (-0.297) (0.167) 
Certificate 
 
0.022 0.019 
  (1.581) (1.389) 
Diploma 
 
0.016 0.016 
  (0.912) (0.937) 
Bachelor degree 
 
-0.008 -0.007 
  (-0.449) (-0.374) 
Graduate 
 
0.000 -0.002 
  (0.007) (-0.068) 
Post-graduate 
 
-0.023 -0.024 
  (-0.981) (-1.035) 
Employer tenure 
 
0.004*** 0.004***   
(4.932) (4.741) 
Weekly hours worked 
  
0.002***    
(3.803) 
Occupational dummies No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.573*** 0.737*** 0.652***  
(8.623) (9.970) (8.480) 
R2 0.014 0.040 0.047 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  All estimations consist of 4582 observations.  
Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
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Table 3: Regression Equations for My Pay is Negotiated, I Have Been Successful in Negotiating Since Joining, and I Have 
Asked for a Pay Raise (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 Pay is negotiated  Successful since joining I have asked  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female -0.092*** -0.072*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.049*** -0.040*** -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.026 
 (-5.502) (-4.328) (-3.471) (-3.988) (-3.198) (-2.598) (-3.776) (-2.566) (-1.420) 
Age 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.006** 0.005* 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (7.301) (3.798) (3.504) (3.526) (1.572) (1.318) (5.173) (2.727) (2.302) 
Age squared -2.9x10-4*** -1.4x10-4*** -1.2x10-4*** -1.1x10-4*** -6.5x10-5** -5.3x10-5 -2.4x10-4*** -1.9x10-4*** -1.6x10-4*** 
 (-6.480) (-2.957) (-2.618) (-2.821) (-1.472) (-1.196) (-5.028) (-3.455) (-2.994) 
English 0.031 0.043** 0.040** -0.011 -0.006 -0.009 0.018 -0.003 -0.009 
 (1.506) (2.080) (1.899) (-0.605) (-0.330) (-0.468) (0.726) (-0.126) (-0.369) 
Married  0.016 0.017  0.033 0.034  0.003 0.005 
  (0.983) (1.072)  (2.452) (2.529)  (0.157) (0.299) 
Dependents  0.034 0.041**  -0.014 -0.009  -0.027 -0.015 
  (1.951) (2.350)  (-0.935) (-0.578)  (-1.415) (-0.778) 
Certificate  -0.015 -0.018*  -0.001 -0.003  0.048*** 0.043** 
  (-0.713) (-0.864)  (-0.057) (-0.188)  (2.258) (2.022) 
Diploma  0.011 0.011  0.026 0.026  0.032* 0.033** 
  (0.447) (0.465)  (1.238) (1.256)  (1.306) (1.347) 
Bachelor degree  0.078*** 0.080***  0.054* 0.055*  0.038 0.040 
  (3.221) (3.300)  (2.558) (2.610)  (1.457) (1.556) 
Graduate  0.075 0.072  0.049* 0.047*  0.023 0.020 
  (2.350) (2.297)  (1.745) (1.687)  (0.718) (0.609) 
Post-graduate  0.053* 0.052*  0.062* 0.061  0.025 0.022 
  (1.798) (1.755)  (2.339) (2.297)  (0.778) (0.699) 
Employer tenure  -0.004*** -0.004***  0.008*** 0.008***  0.022*** 0.021*** 
  (-2.723) (-2.876)  (6.049) (5.914)  (15.284) (15.103) 
Weekly hours worked   0.003***   0.002***   0.004*** 
   (5.510)   (3.412)   (7.050) 
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Occupational dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant -0.205** 0.224*** 0.123*** -0.061 -2.6x10-4 -0.073 0.696*** 0.498*** 0.664*** 
 (-2.468) (2.209) (1.149) (-0.921) (-0.003) (-0.819) (8.140) (5.215) (6.498) 
R2 0.032 0.128 0.137 0.014 0.043 0.046 0.020 0.103 0.114 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  All estimations consist of 
4582 observations.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Part-time and Full-time Subsamples: Regression Equations for My Pay is 
Negotiated, I Have Been Successful in Negotiating Since Joining, and I Have Asked for a 
Pay Raise (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
Pay is negotiated Successful since joining I have asked 
 Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female -0.023 -0.051** 0.039 -0.053** -0.026 -0.015 
 (-0.624) (-2.387) (1.374) (-2.396) (-0.608) (-0.619) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.058 0.172 0.340 -0.198* -0.181 -0.625*** 
 (0.242) (1.259) (1.430) (-1.748) (-0.926) (-4.817) 
R2 0.090 0.111 0.046 0.033 0.073 0.101 
Observations 1646 2936 1646 2936 1646 2936 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
 
Demographic and job controls are as listed in Table 3. 
 
Part-time here is defined as < 38 hours per week. 
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Table 5: Regression Equations for the Reasons that I Did Not Ask for a Pay Raise: (i) I Am 
Satisfied with My Wage and (ii) I Am Satisfied with My Role (AWRS 2013-2014). Includes a 
Full Set of 641 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 Satisfied with wage Satisfied in role 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.070** 0.095** 0.072* -0.024 -0.070** -0.093*** 
 (2.116) (2.502) (1.844) (-1.073) (-2.059) (-2.665) 
Age -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012** -0.009 -0.008 
 (-1.174) (-0.913) (-0.759) (-2.411) (-1.043) (-0.878) 
Age squared 1.5x10-4 1.5x10-4 1.3x10-4 1.7x10-4*** 1.4x10-4 1.1x10-4 
 (1.545) (1.316) (1.123) (2.945) (1.310) (1.099) 
English 0.085* 0.074 0.075 0.049 0.075* 0.075* 
 (1.951) (1.612) (1.636) (1.619) (1.766) (1.812) 
Married  -0.025 -0.022  0.050 0.052* 
  (-0.720) (-0.635)  (1.543) (1.651) 
Dependents  -0.003 -0.025  -0.008 -0.031 
  (-0.067) (-0.620)  (-0.213) (-0.809) 
Certificate  -0.009 -0.006  -0.008 -0.004 
  (-0.216) (-0.132)  (-0.188) (-0.104) 
Diploma  -0.025 -0.031  0.029 0.023 
  (-0.437) (-0.546)  (0.585) (0.460) 
Bachelor degree  0.013 0.013  0.023 0.023 
  (0.259) (0.259)  (0.489) (0.497) 
Graduate  -0.117* -0.111  0.078 0.084 
  (-1.685) (-1.583)  (1.102) (1.185) 
Post-graduate  -0.028 -0.025  -0.059 -0.055 
  (-0.427) (-0.375)  (-1.018) (-0.956) 
Employer tenure  -0.001 -0.001  0.002 0.002 
  (-0.231) (-0.148)  (0.581) (0.675) 
Weekly hours worked   -0.005***   -0.005*** 
   (-2.858)   (-3.095) 
Occupational dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.336** 0.650*** 0.862*** 0.374*** 0.114 0.327 
 (2.049) (2.691) (3.447) (3.732) (0.549) (1.485) 
R2 0.010 0.021 0.026 0.015 0.027 0.037 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  All estimations consist of 1593 observations.  Standard errors are clustered by 
employer. 
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Table 6: Regression Equations for the Reasons that I Did Not Ask for a Pay Raise: (iii) 
There is No Process Here, (iv) I Am Concerned about My Relationships, (v) My Role is not 
Worthy of Higher Pay (AWRS 2013-2014). Includes a Full Set of 641 Employer-Dummy 
Variables. 
 No process Concerned about relationships Role not worthy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.053 -0.012 -0.015 
 (-1.546) (-0.397) (-0.429) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Job Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.158 0.090 -0.042 
 (0.883) (0.573) (-0.248) 
R2 0.030 0.024 0.030 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels.  All estimations consist of 1593 observations.  Standard errors are 
clustered by employer. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Estimations by Age Sub-Samples (AWRS 2013-2014).  Full Set of 840 
Employer-Dummies Included. 
 Pay is negotiated Successful since joining I have asked 
 Age<41 Age>40 Age<41 Age>40 Age<41 Age>40 
Female -0.008 -0.123*** -0.019 -0.077*** -0.041 0.009 
 (-0.329) (-4.100) (-0.875) (-2.912) (-1.445) (0.335) 
English 0.033 0.033 0.024 -0.078** -0.003 0.008 
 (1.000) (1.022) (0.907) (-2.343) (-0.093) (0.190) 
Married 0.032 0.011 0.031 0.033 0.058** -0.043* 
 (1.187) (0.504) (1.314) (1.606) (2.145) (-1.815) 
Dependents 0.068** 0.029 -0.004 -0.015 -0.060** 0.011 
 (2.427) (1.255) (-0.170) (-0.691) (-2.115) (0.434) 
Certificate 0.021 -0.042 0.006 -0.036 0.049 0.040 
 (0.695) (-1.446) (0.228) (-1.320) (1.481) (1.217) 
Diploma 0.039 -0.019 0.009 0.039 -0.016 0.080** 
 (1.029) (-0.568) (0.265) (1.167) (-0.402) (2.089) 
Bachelor degree 0.081** 0.086** 0.055* 0.045 0.038 0.085** 
 (2.325) (2.557) (1.761) (1.309) (1.039) (2.074) 
Graduate 0.040 0.094** 0.027 0.056 0.041 0.040 
 (0.743) (1.960) (0.673) (1.224) (0.787) (0.862) 
Post-graduate 0.020 0.088* 0.066 0.065 0.052 0.046 
 (0.463) (1.916) (1.600) (1.541) (1.034) (0.928) 
Employer tenure -0.003 -0.002 0.016*** 0.005*** 0.041*** 0.015*** 
 (-0.940) (-1.544) (5.646) (3.408) (11.411) (8.872) 
Weekly hours worked 0.004*** 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (2.787) (1.041) (1.681) (2.065) (3.321) (4.873) 
Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.442*** 0.592*** 0.012 0.105 0.428*** 0.354*** 
 (3.974) (6.362) (0.125) (1.328) (4.006) (3.971) 
R2 0.112 0.160 0.048 0.043 0.130 0.107 
Observations 2370 2212 2370 2212 2370 2212 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
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Appendix B: Estimations for I Have Asked for a Pay Raise by Tenure Sub-Samples 
(AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
 I have asked for a pay raise 
 Tenure<1 year Tenure<3 years Tenure<5 years 
Female -0.047 -0.017 -0.010 
 (-0.419) (-0.466) (-0.326) 
Age 0.015 0.009 0.015** 
 (0.510) (0.931) (2.052) 
Age squared -2.7x10-4 -1.4x10-4 -2.2x10-4** 
 (-0.718) (-1.198) (-2.328) 
English 0.088 -0.050 -0.027 
 (0.607) (-1.241) (-0.813) 
Married 0.107 0.017 0.015 
 (1.081) (0.500) (0.575) 
Dependents -0.120 -0.063* -0.055* 
 (-1.401) (-1.680) (-1.867) 
Certificate -0.007 0.057 0.053 
 (-0.067) (1.328) (1.564) 
Diploma -0.105 0.029 0.048 
 (-0.675) (0.566) (1.178) 
Bachelor degree 0.270*** -0.021 0.033 
 (3.066) (-0.437) (0.837) 
Graduate 0.252** 0.020 0.040 
 (2.066) (0.334) (0.780) 
Post-graduate 0.489** 0.014 0.037 
 (2.482) (0.246) (0.739) 
Weekly hours worked 0.001 0.003* 0.003** 
 (0.183) (1.779) (2.209) 
Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.171* 0.422* 0.365** 
 (1.822) (1.945) (2.184) 
R2 0.032 0.049 0.054 
Observations 413 1976 2687 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
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Appendix C: Log-Wage Estimations (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a full set of Employer-
Dummy Variables. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.385*** -0.289*** -0.147*** 
 (-10.878) (-6.976) (-3.708) 
Age 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 
 (7.912) (5.942) (4.700) 
Age squared -6.9x10-4*** -5.8x10-4*** -4.1x10-4*** 
 (-7.464) (-5.818) (-4.381) 
English -0.015 -0.016 -0.056 
 (-0.253) (-0.280) (-0.976) 
Married  -0.029 -0.014 
  (-0.865) (-0.419) 
Dependents  -0.070* 0.010 
  (-1.933) (0.302) 
Certificate  0.068 0.037 
  (1.587) (0.914) 
Diploma  0.014 0.017 
  (0.263) (0.332) 
Bachelor degree  0.156*** 0.173*** 
  (2.989) (3.497) 
Graduate  0.115 0.091 
  (1.427) (1.192) 
Post-graduate  0.274*** 0.261*** 
  (3.677) (3.742) 
Employer Tenure  0.009*** 0.007** 
  (3.287) (2.575) 
Weekly hours worked   0.030*** 
   (15.134) 
Occupational dummies No Yes Yes 
Constant 4.322*** 4.888*** 3.755*** 
 (25.563) (24.036) (18.259) 
R2 0.075 0.175 0.272 
Observations 4467 4467 4467 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
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Appendix D: Extracts from the Questionnaire Wording in the AWRS Survey 
 
Method of Setting Pay  
C1 How is your wage/salary determined?  
Please select one response only  
CODE FRAMES  MOSP 
Negotiated amount with my employer  1 
By an enterprise agreement (EBA)  2 
By an award (i.e. the relevant pay rate contained in the award, and no more)  3 
My employer offered me an amount that was more than the award/standard rate, 
and I accepted  
4 
Other (Please specify)  990 
Don’t know 997 
 
Salary Negotiations (After Commencement)  
C2 Which of the following best describes the actions you have taken in relation to your 
wage/salary since you commenced your employment with your employer?  
Please select all that apply  
[PROGRAMMER: A RESPONDENT CAN’T BE CODE 7 IF THEY ARE CODE 4, AND 
CAN’T BE CODE 6 IF THEY ARE CODES 2, 3 OR 5]  
CODE FRAMES  SALNEG1 
I received a better wage/salary without pursuing it  1 
I have successfully attained a better wage/salary for myself through a promotion  2 
I have successfully attained a better wage/salary for myself through negotiating 
with my manager/employer (i.e. without changing roles)  
3 
I have attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself though applying for a 
promotion, but have been unsuccessful  
4 
I have attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself in my role, but was 
unsuccessful (e.g. request refused or ignored)  
5 
I have not attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself since I commenced 
employment with this employer  
6 
I have not attempted to get a promotion 7 
Prefer not to say 998 
 
Why No Salary Negotiations 
[ASK IF C2 (SALNEG) = CODE 6 OR CODE 7] 
C2a Why have you not attempted to attain a better wage/promotion for yourself since you 
commenced your employment? 
Please select all that apply 
CODE FRAMES SALNEG2 
I’m satisfied with my wage/salary 1 
There is no process/procedure to be able to access a better wage to perform my role 2 
I’m concerned about negative effects on my relationship with my 
manager/employer 
3 
My role wouldn’t be seen by my manager/employer as worthy of a higher wage 4 
I am satisfied in my role 5 
Other (Please specify) 990 
Prefer not to say 998 
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Supplementary Online Tables for Reviewers 
 
Table S1: Enterprise-Size Subsamples: Regression Equations for I Have Been Successful in 
Negotiating Since Joining and I Have Asked for a Pay Raise (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a 
Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
 Successful since joining I have asked 
 Big enterprise Small enterprise Big enterprise 
Small 
enterprise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.015 -0.050*** -0.012 -0.028 
 (-0.529) (-2.648) (-0.347) (-1.262) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.045 -0.070 0.388* 0.338*** 
 (-0.295) (-0.649) (1.907) (2.853) 
R2 0.069 0.046 0.125 0.125 
Observations 1189 3393 1189 3393 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer.  Small enterprises 
have between 5 and 99 employees while big enterprise have more than 99 employees.  
Demographic and job controls are as listed in Table 3. 
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Table S2: Regression Equations for My Pay is Negotiated, I Have Been Successful in 
Negotiating Since Joining and I Have Asked for a Pay Raise (AWRS 2013-2014). These 
incorporate interactions with age and tenure.  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy 
Variables. 
 
 Pay is negotiated Successful since joining I have asked 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.043 0.186 -0.081 -0.015 
 (-0.296) (1.485) (-0.490) (-0.586) 
Age 0.015** 0.012** 0.009 0.011** 
 (2.329) (2.047) (1.379) (2.347) 
Age squared -1.12 x 10-4 -1.20 x 10-4* -1.62 x 10-4** -1.68 x 10-4*** 
 (-1.533) (-1.786) (-2.075) (-3.036) 
Female * Age 0.002 -0.010 0.001  
 (0.243) (-1.515) (0.093)  
Female * Age squared -4.95 x 10-5 9.57 x 10-5 1.35 x 10-5  
 (-0.586) (1.219) (0.138)  
Tenure -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (-2.872) (5.919) (15.100) (12.721) 
Female * Tenure    -0.002 
    (-0.866) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.091 -0.222* 0.385*** 0.325*** 
 (0.632) (-1.855) (2.797) (3.147) 
R2 0.069 0.047 0.114 0.114 
Observations 4582 4582 4582 4582 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer.  Demographic and job controls are as 
listed in Table 3. 
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Table S3: Regression Equations for I Have Been Successful in Negotiating Since Joining 
and I Have Asked for a Pay Raise (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-
Dummy Variables. 
 Successful since joining I have asked 
 (1)# (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.054** -0.056*** -0.049*** -0.014 -0.031 
 (-2.446) (-2.900) (-2.832) (-0.669) (-1.520) 
Part time  -0.062***  -0.080***  
  (-2.614)  (-2.663)  
Female * Part time  0.045  -0.028  
  (1.563)  (-0.798)  
Dependents -0.020 -0.006 -0.019 0.022 -0.000 
 (-1.084) (-0.449) (-0.938) (1.293) (-0.021) 
Female * Dependents   0.029  0.039 
   (1.166)  (1.255) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant 0.042 0.117** 0.020 0.656*** 0.440*** 
 (0.561) (2.346) (0.359) (13.692) (7.284) 
R2 0.035 0.045 0.045 0.102 0.107 
Observations 3190 4582 4582 4582 4582 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer.  Demographic and job controls are as listed in Table 3.  
#:  Sub-sample consists of only those who have asked for a raise. 
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Table S4: Education Subsamples by Post-Graduate Status: Regression Equations for I 
Have Been Successful in Negotiating Since Joining and I Have Asked for a Pay Raise 
(AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
 Successful since joining I have asked 
 Post-graduate Non post-graduate Post-graduate 
Non post-
graduate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.038 -0.042** 0.076 -0.014 
 (-0.935) (-2.300) (1.290) (-0.674) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.065 0.113* 0.057 0.520*** 
 (0.399) (1.866) (0.275) (8.072) 
R2 0.033 0.045 0.090 0.108 
Observations 718 3864 718 3864 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer.  Demographic and job controls 
are as listed in Table 3. 
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ENDNOTES 
i For statements of the latest evidence, see Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) and Blau and Kahn (2017).  Srivastava and 
Sherman (2015) find that having a female manager does little to close the gender gap.  New evidence from Auspurg, 
Hinz and Sauer (2017) points to the role of perceptions of ‘fairness’.   
ii As in Table 3 of Hall and Krueger (2012).      
iii Here, and in later tables, linear probability models are used (probit-equation versions give the same results). 
iv The dependent variable is a zero-one.  We exclude from our ‘zero’ category those who did not ask for a raise directly 
but who did so indirectly in that they asked (unsuccessfully) for a promotion.  There were only 2 people in this 
category; including them makes no difference to our estimates.  
v The AWRS survey itself defines the cutoff between part-time and full-time work in Australia to be 38 hours per 
week.  This leads to the potentially anomalous feature that workers doing, say, 36 hours or 37 hours are counted as 
part-timers.  As a robustness check, however, we tried alternate cutoffs of 35 hours and 40 hours, and found no 
qualitative differences in the results. 
vi We describe this as ‘weak’ because in column 3 of Table 5 the t-statistic on 0.072 is 1.844.      
vii In the case of probability of promotion success, however, we found no statistically significant difference. 
viii The authors of the paper would like to record that they are not persuaded about this; it is listed here only as a 
conceptual possibility.  Moreover, this kind of bias would lead to an under-estimate, not over-estimate, of women’s 
rate of asking.  It should perhaps also be noted -- in response to a referee query -- that women are asking as often as 
men even if they say more often than men that pay is non-negotiable in the workplace.      
ix However, as stressed earlier, the statistical estimates are made ‘within-employer’, so males and females are being 
compared in a consistent way.  This greatly reduces potential concerns about the role of the national pay system.      
x These differences in working hours presumably stem in part from historical and sociological differences in the gender 
roles.  See also the ideas in Gregory and Connolly (2008).      
